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Sustainable development continues to be a key concept for social 
scientists and planners concerned with eco-friendly development. We 
argue that sustainable development should be conceptualized as the 
progressive development of social processes that promote reflexive, 
radical democracy and the equitable sharing of ecological, economic and 
social costs and benefits, rather than as a technocratic solution, end-state 
or equilibrium. In the context of the New Economy and the increasing 
dominance of internet-based information, new kinds of risk are produced. 
In our view, information and communication technologies (ICT) and 
growing gaps in terms of digital access, application, and control are 
significant new generators of risk for digitally disenfranchised 
populations. This includes the risks associated with accessing information 
that is not well suited to local circumstances, sensibilities and 
development aspirations. The digital divide is a source of vulnerabilities 
that are distributed unevenly and an important axis of inequality that 
restructures social relations at the individual, household, community, and 
societal levels. A more insightful sociology of risk is required to support 
the development of a more adequate sociology of development and more 
serviceable approaches to sustainability. Sustainable development must 
address the construction and distribution of risk, and deal with both new 




Given its differential diffusion and application in wealthy and poor 
countries, the information and communications technology (ICT) 
revolution gives rise to a growing global digital divide (ILO, 2001). In 
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this paper, we consider the expansion of the New Economy and its 
associated politics and discourse of risk, focusing on issues of social 
justice, inequality and development in Third World contexts. Looking at 
new kinds of risk linked to the increasing dominance of internet-based 
information, and at the ways that these risks interact with risks emanating 
from other domains, we consider how information and communication 
technologies (ICT) may promote new vulnerabilities that are distributed 
unevenly across societies. This inquiry is intended as a modest 
contribution towards, and a stimulus to, the elaboration of a more 
comprehensive and critical sociology of risk. 
In our view, the digital divide is fast becoming an important new axis 
of inequality that restructures social relations at the individual, household, 
community, and societal levels. ICT and growing gaps in terms of digital 
access, application, and control become significant new generators of risk 
for disadvantaged, digitally disenfranchised populations. The risks 
experienced by individuals, households, and subpopulations often 
manifest in reduced access to, or degradation and devaluation of, 
productive resources. These resources or assets include the very 
foundations of people’s personal productivity—their health and 
education, the latter encompassing both access to formal learning and 
training, and the recognition, validation, and valorization of skills learned 
through experience and informal apprenticeship. New personal exposures 
to risk in the context of digital inequalities likewise include the erosion or 
devaluation of stored assets, and the collapse of social relationships and 
networks that allowed needy individuals to make claims on others. At the 
societal level, these risks have been generated or amplified through and 
throughout institutional-material and cultural structures. 
The analysis of social developments such as the digital divide from 
the standpoint of risk is important because it addresses core processes and 
consequences surrounding rapid, unplanned social and environmental 
change. While analyzing new sources of risk, however, it is important to 
note that risk is not a purely objective category, but one that is 
“constructed” through social practice. Risks may take on their risky 
attributes and may become more important because they are perceived to 
be significant; risks also become more or less severe and consequential 
based on the institutional fabric of society.  
The late 20th century has been characterized as a "risk society" in that 
the culture of risk seems to dominate social thinking (Beck, 1992, 1999). 
The rise of the New Economy over the last few decades has presented not 
only new hazards but also new frameworks for assessing risk. Risk is 
disembedded and individualized. Most studies of risk focus on the “risk 
of” particular events or eventualities. We broaden the discussion here by 
addressing the "risk to” particular groups and communities, which, 
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coupled with risk analysis, can help to explain differential vulnerabilities 
and responses to social change. In unequal societies, the costs and 
benefits of change are not borne equally. The reapportionment of “goods 
and bads” manifests in multiple forms of social exclusion and 
environmental degradation. Sustainable development, we argue, must 
address the construction and distribution of risk as well as respond to the 
progression of old and new forms of inequality. A more insightful 
sociology of risk is needed, not just for its own sake, but also to support 
the development of a more adequate sociology of sustainable 
development. The necessary questions include: How is risk socialized? 
How are people protected from risk? How are costs borne or shared? 
What are the formal and informal arrangements for mitigating, or 




“Sustainable Development” is a broad idea that encompasses social, 
economic, political, and environmental goals. Sustainability actually 
describes several different approaches to development—these approaches 
carry with them different visions of society and different political 
commitments to action. Sustainable development decision-making takes 
place within a context of competing vested interests and contested social, 
economic, political, cultural and environmental values (Jones et al., 
1999). In all of its guises, sustainable development is a reflexive concept 
that carries its normative commitments up-front within its analytical 
apparatus. In this way, sustainable development has more in common 
with the feminist and Marxist social sciences than it does with 
conventional social science disciplines. At the most general level, all 
sustainable development approaches have what might be called the 
“Brundtland commitment,” meaning that societies must meet the needs of 
today without compromising the livelihoods of future generations (Becker 
et al., 1999). At a more specific level, however, differing normative 
commitments present dissimilar approaches to risk, as well as contrary 
political, economic and institutional diagnoses and solutions. 
We are arguing here that unsustainable development is rooted in 
inequality. The rich pursue unsustainable forms of livelihood and lifestyle 
in the quest for status, wealth, and profits—they are able to do so by 
externalizing the costs of unsustainable practices; the poor may also 
contribute to environmental destruction in their attempt to eek out a living 
today—even if this means undermining the basis of tomorrow's 
livelihood. Systemic approaches to sustainable development must, 
therefore, address the causes and consequences of inequality. This 
approach to sustainable development takes eco-social justice as a central 
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tenet and includes, as necessary preconditions and as worthy goals, both 
the lengthening of time horizons and the redefinition of whose interests 
are to be included and sustained. It involves the broadening of democratic 
participation in the ownership and control of resources. It also means 
more closely linking the derivation of benefits with the defraying of costs, 
so that all participate more fully and equitably. In terms of production and 
consumption systems and management of environmental impacts, this 
version of sustainable development calls for holistic vision and attention 
to the full range of ecological costs engendered, and ecological services 
rendered (Mooney & Ehrlich, 1997). 
Sustainable development (and risk) involves interactions of natural 
and social systems, both of which are complex, non-linear, dynamic and 
unpredictable. These qualities mean that sustainable development as an 
endpoint or state of equilibrium may be a worthy and useful goal, but will 
never be attained (Jaffe, 1990). Sustainable development should rather be 
conceptualized as a process that allows society to minimize its eco-
impacts while maintaining or increasing the capacity to support a 
desirable quality of life for all. 
As a philosophy, sustainable development embraces the precept, 
“first, do no lasting harm.” As powerful new technologies are introduced 
rapidly, and are capable of inflicting great damage, sustainability includes 
capacity for ex ante impact assessment and the development of nimble 
and responsive social systems that are capable of engaging in the 
activities of regulation and timely decision-making. Sustainable 
development calls for the design of production and consumption systems 
that work in greater harmony with natural processes, and reduce the 
potential for degradation or catastrophic collapse of natural systems. It 
puts a special responsibility on human beings to treat their fellows and the 
rest of the world in such a way as to avoid destruction of cultural and 
biological diversity. It is a ‘radical’ orientation when it addresses 
contradictions in commercial-industrial development through a 
combination of fundamental changes in values, organization, and 
technology. It is also a ‘conservative’ orientation when it admits to limits 
in our ability to comprehend, model, and manage natural processes. This 
implies a need to err on the side of caution and safety (Gertler, 2001). 
Sustainable development is not a clear-cut project, nor one with 
predetermined solutions. The nature-culture divide is more constructed 
than real. Furthermore, much of what we consider to be natural 
landscapes exist due to human intervention (Cronon, 1996). Throughout 
history, human projects—from making gardens to establishing transport 
and communication infrastructure—necessarily have involved some 
degree of ecological disturbance (Sing, 2001). In unequal societies 
especially, change has differential impacts and creates or confirms who 
Jaffe and Gertler 
© Currents: New Scholarship in the Human Services 
Volume 7, Number 2, 2008 
 
5 
reaps the benefits and who must absorb the costs. There are winners and 
losers. Typically, in unequal societies, the costs of change are socialized, 
diffuse and generalized across society, while the benefits are privatized, 
well-defined and individualized. The construction of major public works, 
such as hydro-electric dams, can seem to have a contradictory effect 
where they create a diffuse and general public good with very particular 
and sharp negative effects for a minority (often an already disadvantaged 
subgroup). The pattern of unequal sharing of costs and benefits may play 
out in different ways, but the general principal holds. The rich can usually 
avoid the negative consequences and reap a disproportionate share of the 
benefits. Sustainable development, therefore, involves important 
questions regarding the distribution of risk and the degree of acceptable 
disturbance, as well as what landscapes, local ecosystems, and activities 
are to be sustained. In the end, sustainable development is also a matter of 
ethics and value judgments that generally reflect material relations and 
culture, and the power to categorize, to define, and to rank what is valued. 
The sustainable livelihoods approach focuses on the ways that people 
make a living and a life worth living. “A livelihood comprises the 
capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities 
required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can cope 
with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities 
for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other 
livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the long and short term” 
(Chambers & Conway, 1992, p. 7-8). Livelihoods are created, pursued, 
and secured through the mobilization of individual, household, and 
community assets/capitals that are used to carry out activities related to 
production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. The apportionment 
of those assets, and the ways that they shape broader social relations, are 
intrinsic to livelihoods and key to sustainability. 
The ability of social actors to attain livelihoods that are sustainable is 
constrained or augmented by significant processes and structures that 
have undergone fundamental changes in the context of globalization and 
the New Economy. The restructuring and remaking of international 
regulatory regimes, state policies, markets, enterprises, social 
arrangements, and cultural practices, transform the conditions under 
which people pursue livelihoods. Personal, organizational, and communal 
practices are thus shaped by new opportunities but also by new forms of 
risk, uncertainty, insecurity, and danger. These new conditions shape 
choices related to strategies in the spheres of production, consumption, 
distribution, and reproduction, and these strategies themselves change the 
economic, social and ecological conditions under which livelihoods are 
pursued. Social and biophysical realities are intimately linked as people 
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experience increased or decreased security, differential and contradictory 
impacts on their well being, and new types of equality and equity or 
inequality and inequity. In this context they may act or fail to act, invest 
or disinvest, in ways that increase resilience or vulnerability, and that 
promote or degrade ecological systems. They may evaluate individual and 
public choices more broadly or more narrowly. Sustainable livelihoods 
thus become both a condition and a goal for sustainable development of 




The literature on vulnerability points a way forward to understanding the 
impacts of social and technological change. Vulnerability has been 
defined as "the risk of adverse outcomes to receptors or exposure units 
(human groups, ecosystems, and communities) in the face of relevant 
changes in climate, other environmental variables, and social conditions" 
(Clark et al., 2000, p. 2). Vulnerability is a multidimensional concept that 
includes: exposure to crises, stresses, or shocks; degree of sensitivity to 
exposure; resilience or capacity to cope with the damage of exposure to 
multiple stresses (Clark et al., 2000; Polsky et al, 2003). An important 
component of vulnerability is the ability to predict or foresee—which 
includes the ability to interpret—what is happening. In the absence of an 
adequate and finely-tuned ability to do this, managing vulnerability 
hinges on the ability to build flexible systems that moderate or mitigate 
sensitivity through adaptation, portfolio diversification, and innovation. 
Vulnerability is greatly affected by wealth and poverty; in general poorer 
people, regions and countries have greater problems adapting to or coping 
with change. A key factor is the ability to marshal relevant resources, 
including non-material resources related to social networks and 
education. Institutional and organizational issues are also central. An 
important portion of the coping capacity of most societies inheres in, and 
relies on, its institutions and organizations; the question is how well and 
how equitably do institutions and organizations respond to crises, but 
also, how well they have laid the groundwork for resiliency. In societies 
where coping and adaptation are left mostly to individuals, one can expect 
vulnerabilities to be acute and widespread, particularly if there is 
widespread poverty and need (Chinsinga, 2004). 
Risk is sometimes conceptualized as hazard plus the probability of its 
occurrence—divided by capacity to withstand, absorb, adapt to, or 
mitigate. Note, however, that risk is derivative of hazard—hazards occur 
or are constructed first. Society helps to determine what is dangerous, and 
also generally influences the conditions of exposure. A key source of risk 
is variability. If pests and weather always harmed the crop to the same 
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degree, these would not be classified as risks, but rather as certainties. By 
definition, those things that increase variability increase risk.2 "The 
concept of risk begins where our trust in our security ends and ceases to 
be relevant when a potential catastrophe occurs" (Beck, 1999, p. 135). 
Society and culture are critical to risk in many ways—they help to 
determine how and when risks are perceived, and to what degree risks 
will be shared or individualized. This means there is substantial variation 
within and between societies in how they recognize and deal with risks 
(Hood et al., 2001). 
The various literatures on risk are more in competition than in 
discussion with one another. Much of this writing is devoted to analysis 
of individual level responses to probabilities of undesired outcomes, but 
there is little attention to the social context of decision-making. The pro-
development literature (c.f. Avery, 2000) talks about risk in relative 
terms. It views risk consciousness as an over-reaction to social change—
in short, a recent form of Luddism. Another literature, long-established, 
focuses on the individual's calculus of risk in making decisions about 
their own production practices, particularly cropping systems (c.f. 
Cancian, 1980). This is frequently an applied literature that poses risk 
aversion as something to be overcome in order to move beyond the 
developmental limits of traditional societies. The literature that focuses on 
modernity as risk society (Beck, 1992, 1999) advances the position that 
the condition of reflexive modernity is to be increasingly cognizant of the 
attendant risks of technological change while at the same time 
understanding the limitations of science in correcting them. 
In our view, significant transformational processes at work in 
contemporary society are associated with their own sources and types of 
risk. In agriculture, for example, natural risks originate in the baseline 
variability of climates and environments. Market-related risks derive from 
the nature of market competition, from the changeable character of 
consumption that depends on many factors, including fashion, and 
uncertainties about the price and supply of inputs for production. Techno-
system risks derive from undermining nature's resiliency by the degrading 
and polluting of resources, by simplifying ecosystems, and by narrowing 
or modifying the genetic information available for species’ adaptation. 
Social risks relate to distribution, regulation, inclusion/exclusion, and the 
more subtle problem of meaning. These risks take on a different character 
depending on whether they are acute or chronic, short- or long-term. 
                                                           
2 Luhmann (1993) speaks of the difference between risk and danger―risk 
being the result of one’s own calculated decisions, and danger being the 
harm to people or groups that is caused by the risks taken by others, but 
this paper will address both of these conditions as situations of risk. 
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Long-standing relations of risk often invoke risk-minimizing 
strategies to cope with them. Agricultural production systems, for 
example, have evolved in the context of risks emanating from multiple 
sources: weather, pests, markets, accidents, disruptions in labour supply, 
and so on. Managing these risks has, in some cases, led to the elaboration 
of quite resilient and stable farming systems. These systems rely on 
optimization strategies that deal relatively effectively with a predictable 
range and frequency of risk factors. Under reasonably stable regimes of 
risk, the resource management strategies deployed are often quite 
appropriate and adapted in a manner that contributes to long-term 
sustainability. In this case, risk aversion may translate to the adoption of a 
“precautionary principal” in which social actors use extreme care in 
modifying the parameters of their production (and livelihood) systems. To 
some observers, this appears to be a tenacious kind of conservatism. 
Risk-averse behaviours may take many forms, some of which 
contribute to, and some of which undermine, the long-term sustainability 
of production systems. Under regimes of increasing risk, risk aversion 
may lead all kinds of social actors to discount the future and to adopt a 
shortened time horizon—to exhibit heightened “time preference.” This is 
an attempt to increase the predictability of outcomes, to raise the certainty 
that investments will be recouped and rewarded. As Leach and Mearns 
(1991, p. 3) state, heightened time preference can affect the environment 
in different ways.  
 
First, fewer investments are likely to be undertaken, 
particularly investments with longer- term payoffs and 
large initial costs. The impact of this on the environment 
depends on the type of investments – i.e. whether 
environmentally damaging, or in conservation measures, 
or non environment-related (e.g. in human capital such as 
investments in education; or in inventories etc). However, 
high rates of time preference do imply a more rapid 
development of exhaustible resources, shorter rotation 
periods and smaller stocks of renewable resources (Pearce, 
Barbier & Markandya, 1990). High rates also reduce 
incentives to find more depleting resources (water, copper) 
or to develop technologies or output-mixes that economise 
on them. 
 
Social actors may adapt to risk, but they may also work to mitigate it. 
Mitigation implies an intervention that actually changes the nature of the 
risk itself, rather than just the response to it. Sometimes this distinction is 
more apparent than real, however, in that practices that mitigate risk may 
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in the long run be adaptive, while adaptations may involve practices that 
fundamentally transform the character of risk. 
Social safety nets, both formal and informal, play an important role 
in mitigating and adapting to risk. Insurance for one group, however, may 
be license for another. Unemployment insurance, for example, mitigates 
the risk of consumption crises for workers. From a different standpoint, 
this same mitigation can be seen to make workers more vulnerable. As an 
adaptation for capital, it allows industry to lower relative wages and be 
more flexible and ‘resilient’—that is, to lay workers off with greater 
impunity. In this case, the state may be considered complicit in aiding the 
creation of a ‘reserve army of labour,’ although its intention was 
otherwise. 
The social context that serves to mitigate risk may, in some cases, 
encourage more risky practices. Seatbelts and air bags may encourage 
drivers to drive faster and more carelessly. Crop insurance, necessary to 
protect farmers in risky environments, may encourage farmers to plant 
crops that are poorly adapted to local conditions. This loss of risk 
aversion may even be a desired outcome of crop insurance in light of the 
very low returns for traditional crops grown in a given region, such as is 
seen on the Canadian Prairies with respect to staple grains. Farmers may 
allow crop insurance to bear a large portion of the risk. These patterns 
contain distributional implications – those who are the most affluent and 
largest farmers have the resources to access crop insurance and other risk 
spreading (or income stabilizing) mechanisms and also have the cash 
reserves necessary to engage in innovative (risky) behaviour. Crop 
insurance coverage may also require practices that are known to be 
environmentally harmful, but less risky to the insurer. 
As the context moves from one of increasing risk to one of 
uncertainty in which it is difficult if not impossible to assign probabilities 
to the occurrence of a particular outcome, social actors, paradoxically, 
may adopt novel practices that are riskier (economically and 
ecologically), and at the same time continue to exhibit a shortened time 
horizon (Jaffe, 1989). The rise of uncertainty implies a qualitative as well 
as a quantitative change in risk in which social actors find it increasingly 
difficult to anticipate or to predict the likelihood of events and conditions 
that have significance for the enterprise. Perversely, attempts to deal with 
uncertainty may themselves contribute to greater unpredictability as 
individuals and sectors experiment in uncharted territory—and as the 
cumulative impact of adaptive decision making leads to intensification of 
competition, the flooding of markets, or the overloading of ecological 
carrying capacity. 
These strategies may involve novel, unorthodox, or quite extreme 
changes in practices or products. Under the new calculus of survival, it is 
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harder to say what will work, and whether there can be any expectation 
that what works today will work again next season. It may thus seem to 
make sense to try something that is untested, to attempt to “make a 
killing” with the hope that one success can be achieved before something 
dire or unheralded takes place. It may also be the case that, faced with 
increased uncertainty, vulnerable players will withdraw from the field of 
production, abandoning livelihood efforts or failing to maintain resources 
in a productive state. 
For small rural producers whose production and enterprise 
reproduction strategies are household-based, elevated risk and uncertainty 
has particular implications stemming from the intergenerational character 
and logic of resource use. Family farmers and peasant producers manage 
resources in the context of, and under the constraints of, the interlocking 
cycles of family and enterprise development (Bennet, 1982). 
(Agri)cultural commitments to pass on both the vocation and the land, 
constitute a strong orientation towards a planning horizon and strategy 
that is intergenerational and developmental, as well as short-term and 
cash-generating. When uncertainty combines with worsening terms of 
trade to challenge the wisdom or practicality of a livelihood rooted on the 
land, the plans and logic of the household-based enterprise are thrown 
more strongly into short-term mode. In this context, it will make less 
sense to invest in long-term strategies to improve or protect the 
productivity of agricultural resources. The possibility for taking on such 
projects may be further undermined by a shortage of labour power due to 
selective out-migration of the young and able bodied.  
Risk and uncertainty affect social actors unequally. Some social 
actors are better positioned to withstand a lack of return on investment or 
shocks to their organization or livelihood. What is an acceptable level of 
risk for some is barely tolerable for others. Social actors experience 
different levels of insecurity in relation to their control over resources and 
the reliability of their command over entitlements should a negative 
outcome occur. The more doubtful the ability to successfully survive 
unfavourable consequences, the more intense the response to risk and 
uncertainty is likely to be. Insecurity itself can be a source and a generator 
of risk and uncertainty when it involves tenuous access to, and control 
over, strategic resources. Many of the changes that we recognize as part 
of the New Economy can reposition social actors vis-à-vis access to 
resources. This occurs when new social and political developments either 
entrench existing privileges or provide (new) groups with preferential 
access to “rents” of various kinds. This may also occur when new 
technologies, products or markets provide fresh opportunities for 
accumulation. 
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It is important to recognize that insecurities have origins that are 
social and political as well as more classically economic and ecological. 
Beyond the competitive forces of globalized markets and the power of 
global economic actors, and beyond the costs and risks of over-loaded or 
degraded ecosystems, personal insecurity can often stem from 
persecution, institutionalized discrimination, or the capricious use of 
political, legal, police, or military powers. The issues may be as mundane 
and as commonplace as the patriarchal privileges that frustrate the ability 
of women to control crucial aspects of their personal and economic lives. 
The insecurity may be structural and contextual, as in the case of 
undocumented (illegal) workers, or squatters without secure tenure on the 
land. It can also be dramatic and cataclysmic, as in the case of people 
displaced by warfare or ethnic cleansing. 
This is not to say that oppression inevitably breeds insecurity. 
Longstanding, stable systems of oppression may provide a nexus of 
security for those within them, particularly if these systems involve some 
level of (mutual) obligation of the oppressor for the oppressed. Those 
whose social positions are dependent on oppressive relationships 
(meaning that they have tenuous control over entitlements) may be 
threatened, and experience heightened insecurity, as a result of challenges 
to, and even an abatement of, that oppression. This is not an argument for 
living with or embracing oppression, but rather to explain why people 
may be reluctant to trade one form of structural (and thus relatively 
secure) insecurity for new arrangements that are of a more open and 
unknown quantity. At a more fundamental level, oppression typically 
deprives its targets of many forms of freedom and protection, which are 
crucial to self-determination and the ability to respond adequately to the 
innate risks of living. Oppression is likewise often associated with forms 
of “lock-in” that perpetuate low levels of productivity and high levels of 
ecological risk.3 
In many settings, corruption, both petty and pervasive, undermines 
rational and legitimate strategies to develop and use resources in a 
manner that meets tests of viability, sustainability, and social equity. As 
neo-liberal reform movements take over centre stage (Wedeman, 2004) 
(displacing earlier campaigns to head off and to decapitate challenges 
from socialist- or communist-inspired reformers), new kinds of political 
and economic corruption may be routinely ignored or condoned. This 
corruption becomes a major drain on resources and a source of 
                                                           
3 The authors are particularly familiar with this phenomenon in poor 
countries, such as Haiti, El Salvador, Indonesia, and the Philippines, in 
which the pervasiveness of patrimonial cronyism and authoritarianism has 
contributed to underdevelopment and environmental degradation. 
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uncertainty and instability that subverts all forms of legitimate business or 
public-spirited intervention. 
Risk, uncertainty, and insecurity interact with each other in complex 
ways. The outcomes for individuals and for the environment are 
indeterminate and rarely linear (in any respect). There are risks and 
uncertainties associated with any life. To some degree, these are normal, 
acceptable, and inescapable. As with other phenomena, however, there 
are cumulative effects, thresholds, and tripping points that may trigger 
quite dramatic effects. These can include movement to new levels or 
forms of activity. Risks contribute to uncertainty. Uncertainties can bring 
new forms or levels of risk. Insecurity is an outcome with both objective 
(material) and subjective (psychological) dimensions. Insecurity may 
contribute causally to uncertainty, and to our perceptions and responses 
when confronting risks. 
As has been suggested, risk and uncertainty are, to some degree, 
necessary and unavoidable components of any system or situation. They 
may be associated with certain positive habits and adaptive stances, 
creating new openings and keeping the precautionary principle alive as a 
working proposition. On the other hand, risks, uncertainties, and 
insecurities may be manipulated and deflected in ways that punish or 
handicap certain groups of social actors, and reward, disproportionately 
and without merit, those who can insulate or protect themselves. The 
contracts (or informal and customary arrangements) under which products 
and services are produced or traded, and those that govern the relationship 
between employees and employers, shift risk. Where exposure to or 
assignment of responsibility for risk is concerned, power is a constant 
companion. The players in the New Economy may be considered 
entrepreneurs when they make investments and take financial risks. They 
may also be acting in an entrepreneurial fashion when they find new ways 
to reapportion risk. Sometimes these risks are quite difficult to document 
or discern due to their nebulous, diffuse, or delayed character. In other 
instances, the risks are tangible and well understood but, nevertheless, 
ignored if they can be shifted onto more vulnerable partners—young, 
female employees, for example, who can be replaced when and if they 
develop the quite predictable health problems associated with the risky 
character of their working conditions.  
 
The New Economy, ICT and the Reapportionment of Risk 
 
The New Economy is the outcome of a series of multi-layered and multi-
level societal events and processes. Many factors have contributed to its 
emergence as a global phenomenon: the new orthodoxy of the market and 
the consequent transformation of the role of the state in production, trade, 
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and welfare; the rising importance of finance capital in determining 
strategies of development; discoveries in the biological sciences and 
information technology; the increasing role of communications—
including vehicles that allow social actors to bypass monopoly media; and 
the rising impacts of social movements, civil society, and women’s 
formal and informal participation in the labour force. The New Economy 
is restructuring national and regional economies and economic sectors in 
different ways. One can point to the rising importance of cities and their 
hinterlands, the decline of the welfare function of states, and a New 
International Division of Labour (NIDL) in which production for global 
markets is controlled by a relatively few transnational corporations. As 
opposed to the previous (Fordist) era, in the NIDL particular labour 
processes are located based upon the ‘competitive advantages’ of place—
largely related to their environmental, social and political conditions and 
regulations—as well as the application of selected techno-scientific 
advances in the production process. In many places these ‘competitive 
advantages’ are mostly dependent upon the intensified exploitation of 
environment and labour, with negative consequences for local 
environments and social conditions.4 
The New Economy represents/carries/transmits, and structurally 
encompasses and accommodates, a dramatic rise and extension of both 
risk and uncertainty. This increase in risk and uncertainty stems from 
increased rates of change (technologies, markets, policies, etc.), from the 
interaction of regions and subsystems that were formerly relatively 
separate and isolated, and from new “rules” of competitive market 
relations which make risky behaviours and practices more common and 
commonplace. For individuals, families, communities, and organizations 
this new set of conditions and contingencies creates uncertainties and 
insecurities that can interfere with the capacity to work (individually and 
collectively) towards sustainability. 
The New Economy increases exposure to risk, uncertainty, and 
insecurity through a variety of mechanisms and pathways that affect 
every sphere of public and private life. This heightened exposure often 
follows predictable patterns, affecting the poor more than the rich, the 
less-educated more than the university-degreed, and the older more than 
the younger technology user. Expanding markets displace other modes of 
economic coordination and exchange, while economic power is 
centralized and concentrated, leading to new competitive pressures, but 
also to anti-competitive, oligopolistic practices. Corporate strategies 
                                                           
4 The haphazard and predatory character of the linkages between these 
export producing activities and the local economy also increases the risks 
associated with their existence within a region or country. 
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reflect increasing uncertainties, commercial pressures, and risks which are 
generally passed on to workers and consumers but may also result in 
reduced corporate longevity. Employment is increasingly contingent and 
insecure. Increased use of markets to regulate, allocate, and coordinate 
(dismantling of marketing boards, etc.) introduces risks that stem from the 
decline of public protection and the lack of (local) control over 
commerce. Declining and fluctuating terms of trade for resource sectors 
make it difficult to plan for a stable rate of exploitation and encourage 
rapid extraction. Growing foreign exchange dependency in the context of 
rising import costs and falling export revenues means increased exposure 
to the risk of secular deterioration of the terms of trade, and the risk of 
“structural adjustment” imposed by the IMF. Rising exposure to 
international currency and commodity market fluctuations introduces risk 
through monetary systems. The biotechnological revolution implies 
global-scale experiments with the stuff of life. Technical and cybernetic 
refinements to deal with risk lead to new forms of risky activity.  
Deregulation/reregulation leads to changing rules of performance and 
the social reallocation of risk given reduced state subsidies, state 
interventions, and regulatory efforts, as well as the withdrawal of social 
safety nets. On the other hand, the state may be called upon to underwrite 
risks that the private sector is unwilling or unable to absorb, as in the case 
of the nuclear industry or more generally in the provision of medical 
services to workers injured on the job, or to citizens injured by industrial 
diseases. The state may also step in to absorb the risks where these may 
threaten the accumulation and legitimation of both the private and public 
sectors, such as happened with the Canadian Bombardier loans of 2003, 
the US Chrysler bailout, the Mexican debt crisis, and the US Savings and 
Loan debacle. The extension of business managerial models to public 
agencies focuses attention on a narrowed set of performance criteria. 
Uncertainty increases regarding state policies and programs given fiscal 
austerity, political competition, and the willingness of states to sacrifice 
sectors or regions that are not “performing” economically. Governments 
and agencies are subject to more frequent destabilizing events/forces.5  
The reorganization and downsizing of public agencies erodes their 
                                                           
5 Paradoxically, in some instances governments have found ways to use 
widespread fear and uncertainty to solidify and extend their hold on 
power. In the process, critics are neutralized, the offloading of risks is 
legitimated, and a new ethos of self-interested and selfish behaviour is 
naturalized. No longer is it considered the duty of governments to 
promote economic health by supporting widespread consumption and 
investment in social goods, rather they accept and legitimize a regime of 
highly unequal access and participation. 
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institutional memory, weakens links with sectoral actors, and leads to 
career-oriented survival strategies rather than to work on reforms or 
genuine renewal in the government services. It has also led to the loss of 
external and internal checks and balances on the conduct of private firms, 
thus contributing to a growth in violations of public trust such as the 
accounting abuses that came to light with Enron and World.com in the 
early 2000s. 
Underpinning this new post-Fordist economy are advances in 
information and communications technologies, which make possible the 
coordination of supply chains and the monitoring of activities across great 
distances. These same technologies allow for the rapid transfer of capital 
around the globe. They also allow (some) people and places to be 
connected instantaneously, locally or across enormous distances. These 
developments have also facilitated new and aggressive forms of 
international crime that can envelop whole regions in the transnational 
supply chains of illegal commodities. New ICT technologies also give 
rise to novel forms of fraud, theft, and tax evasion. Whether we are 
talking about overtly criminal acts or routinized forms of corrupt and 
underhanded dealing by public and private bureaucracies, this effectively 
undermines the climate and conditions conducive to the pursuit of 
legitimate livelihoods. 
It could be argued here that the development and subsequent uneven 
adoption of ICT represents a new source of risk, especially for third 
world, rural people. Third world rural communities are embedded in a 
series of nested inequalities that both create the digital divide and increase 
its consequences. Third World countries are often highly dependent on 
First World countries for capital, technology and access to information. 
The spread of technologies such as the internet, therefore, do not fit with 
models of benign, democratic, self-directed evolutionary processes. 
Consistent with the development and commercialization of many other 
new technologies, it appears that the development of the internet is driven 
by the politics and policies of powerful actors on the world stage, 
including states and media corporations (Davidson, 2002; McChesney, 
1999; Mosco, 1996; Schiller, 1996). While the internet has great potential 
as a way to bypass official or corporatized media, it is at present 
dominated by e-commerce, and many governments have instituted 
measures to limit the internet as a domain of free speech or inquiry.  The 
internet itself is also a vector for new forms of risk – for example the new 
risks associated with internet scams and commercial fraud, and chatrooms 
that provide an anonymous vehicle for sexual and other kinds of 
predators. 
The internet offers new opportunities but also threatens to exacerbate 
existing disparities in power via unequal access to, and application of, the 
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associated technologies. The geographic distribution of high-technology 
exports, computer power, and internet hosts follows the hierarchical 
pattern of the core-periphery system (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980), although 
there is no single core but a triadic arrangement of country clusters 
around the cores of Western Europe, North East Asia and North America, 
each with their respective peripheries (Gunaratne, 2002). There is also 
evidence that the use of the internet-based information in development 
programs organized by international aid agencies tends to produce 
dependency and inequality. Reviewing internet use in Latin American 
development projects, Everett (1998, p. 386) concluded that “information 
does not always ensure progress, and integration does not ensure equality. 
[…] Information technology is leading to new forms of dependency.” 
Information and communication technologies appear to be playing an 
increasingly constitutive role with respect to the inclusion and exclusion 
of groups from effective participation in the discourse of 'development'. 
The majority of participants are shut out of critical discussions concerning 
the conception, design, implementation and evaluation of development 
projects both large and small. Priorities and modalities are not subject to 
democratic debate, but are assumed or determined by a technocratic elite 
serving “private” or “public” bureaucracies. 
The ILO (2001) found that only 6 percent of the world’s population 
is on-line, with internet users in industrialized countries accounting for 
between 85-90 percent of the total. Internet users in the United States and 
Canada alone make up 57 percent of the global total, while internet users 
in Africa and the Middle East together account for only 1 percent of 
global internet users. Only 4 percent of internet users reside in Latin 
America. These statistics, however, do not convey the full extent of the 
digital divide. The digital divide has been defined as “inequalities in 
access to the internet, extent of use, knowledge of search strategies, 
quality of technical connections and social support, ability to evaluate the 
quality of information, and diversity of uses” (DiMaggio et al., 2001, p. 
310). Unlike other definitions that emphasize the chasm or gulf that may 
exist between those who have access and those who do not, this definition 
underlines the importance of relative disparities in the ability to obtain, 
use and critically evaluate information via the internet. While it is clear 
that the digital divide has the potential to exacerbate already-existing 
inequalities, “the notion of a binary divide between haves and have-nots 
is…inaccurate and can even be patronizing because it fails to value the 
social resources that diverse groups bring to the table” (Warschauer, 
2003, p. 7). The introduction of ICT may sometimes allow previously 
undervalued characteristics to be appreciated and some previously 
disadvantaged groups to discover that they have attributes that are 
valuable. Whether or not ICT is promoting new forms of inclusion or 
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exclusion, these issues are inescapable because “the ability to access, 
adapt, and create new knowledge using new information and 
communication technology is critical to social inclusion in today’s era” 
(Warschauer, 2003, p. 9). 
In the context of the digital divide, new sources of risk may be 
introduced through the very ability to access new types of information 
coming from ‘global’ sources. The internet-derived provenance of the 
material does not guarantee its usefulness, reliability or its validity. It may 
not be peer-reviewed, and it may not be relevant. This disembedded 
information may depreciate or marginalize local ecological knowledge 
(LEK) (Neis, 2003) even though ‘intelligence’ from the internet may not 
be locally adapted, appropriate, or indeed, risk minimizing.6 Nevertheless, 
information that comes through computerized networks may carry a 
cachet or imprimatur of sophistication—it may be more ‘technified’ and 
considered more modern. Internet technologies may lead to a privileging 
of written discourse over oral communication. Most internet-based 
information is in English and conveys Western modes of thought and 
action. In turn, because of its favoured status, internet technology and 
information may confer a heightened status on the user. Depending on the 
context, this may strengthen existing inequalities or become a source of 
potential resistance to them. 
In the absence of systematic local testing and adaptation, new—
particularly exogenous and deracinated—sources of information may 
increase uncertainty and precipitate unexpected and unwanted outcomes. 
While ICT and the New Economy may heighten the importance of local 
places (this process is sometimes referred to as ‘glocalization’), the scope, 
pace and intensity of competition amongst regions and localities are also 
heightened, as well (Epp & Whitson, 2001). Competition is now 
frequently considered to be the only option for community survival, but 
“extreme competition diminishes the degree of diversity existing in a 
society and contributes to social exclusion: individuals, enterprises, cities 
and nations that are not competitive (enough) are marginalised and 
eliminated from the race” (Blahó, 2001). The information transmitted 
through ICT may not be appropriate to specific places or conditions, and 
may contribute to a reduction in cultural diversity that leads to a decline 
                                                           
6 There are, of course, big differences between accessing information and 
the ability to use it to effect.  Many people, for example, can access 
general information about the WTO, but are powerless to change its rules.  
There are also differences between acquaintance with information and the 
ability to use it as knowledge.  
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in local capacity to innovate in locally adapted and optimal ways. This 
may decrease the potential repertoire of alternative responses that can be 
accessed by people solving such problems in other places as well. 
ICT access has unpredictable consequences for local groups and 
communities in the Third World. While in North America the glocalized 
internet connects people to global sources, it is used primarily for quite 
local interactions. (Tindall & Wellman, 2001). According to some 
researchers, internet communications “increase the size, variety of 
interpersonal ties (sic), and are especially useful for maintaining weak ties 
in between face-to-face encounters” (Wellman & Gulia, 1999, as cited in 
Tindall & Wellman, 2001, p. 276). It appears that the nature of 
community life changes, however, through the presence of internet 
communications. Compared to historically more dominant forms of 
community that tended to be densely-knit, geographically and socially 
bounded social networks, one can observe a shift to “networked 
individualism: greater privatization of community, as contact among 
individuals supplants contact among households and communal groups” 
(Wellman, 2000, 2001, as cited in Tindall & Wellman, 2001, p. 276). The 
implications for Third World rural places can hardly be underestimated, 
as local social networks and communities of place provide a form of 
social insurance, and are critical sites for the reproduction and 
mobilization of social capital. Place-based communities can play a central 
role in the long-term management of natural resources, because many 
conservation initiatives require coordinated, collective action. Local 
communities also serve as the locus that supports adoption of lengthened 
planning horizons. Such communities provide institutional memory with 
respect to the history of the resource. They are also the people who matter 
to those who are making decisions that will impact the future productivity 
and health of local ecosystems. Without such social connections there 
may be less impetus to make long-term investments or to forgo any 
portion of current revenues (Gertler, 1999, 2001). 
In the New Rural Economy, family enterprise continuity becomes 
more uncertain, given the competitive disadvantages of rural regions in 
the unprotected, ultra-competitive globalized economy. The pressures to 
exit increase, apparently at least as fast as do barriers to entry. The 
continuity of the intergenerational transfer of culture, and of orientations 
to community and production, can be ruptured by the dominance of new 
channels of communications and new cultural influences, and through 
increased rates of change combined with pressures for income generation. 
New risks arise with the introduction of new technologies and practices. 
The adoption of technologies and practices can appear to reduce risk for 
individuals, but may in fact shift it onto others or create new risks that 
must be absorbed by communities and societies. Diversification of 
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livelihood strategies can augment and stabilize household incomes, but 
can also increase exposure to new kinds of risk (Gertler, Jaffe, & 
Swystun, 2002). Communities of place are the least stable, and most 
vulnerable to economic and social disruption. They may become 
communities in name only—individualized, privatized, depressed, more 
conflict-ridden, and marginalizing rather than integrating minorities (Jaffe 
& Quark, 2004). Sustainable development as a viable political strategy 
may become increasingly remote as debates become polarized and the 
environment and environmentalists come to be viewed as enemies of 
economic survival and viability. 
Much of the apparent resilience of the New Economy comes from a 
down-loading or up-loading of risk, and an "externalization" or 
socialization of many of the real costs of production. Corporate off-
loading of risk is often accomplished without providing any benefits and 
with no risk premium being afforded to producers (Thu & Durrenberger, 
1998).  This amounts to the corporate appropriation of the risk premium 
without the assumption of risk. This reapportionment of risk takes place 
across international boundaries as well as across classes and segments of 
industries. Indeed, one may now speak about a "New International 
Division of Risk" (NIDR), in addition to the New International Division 
of Labour. 
The identification and prioritization of risk is inherently political. Is 
“economic risk” to be predominantly defined as the risk of slowdown, 
inflation, or changing currency exchange rates, or is it to be conceived 
first and foremost in terms of unemployment and loss of livelihood? Each 
of these definitions of economic risk encapsulates and reflects particular 
interests, and each repositions different groups as winners and losers. 
Political sociology has so far tended to treat the question of risk as an 
individual concern. We propose that it goes far beyond that—to the very 
conditions under which struggles for eco-social justice take place. In this 
brave new world of risk and vulnerability (masked as productivity and 
competitive efficiency), the uneven development and impacts of ICT can 
have far-reaching consequences. Given the context and biases inherent in 
the technological package as it is presently configured, ICT will more 
often than not contribute to the heightening of risk and the exacerbation 
of vulnerabilities for those who can least afford to see any further erosion 
in their precarious situations. ICT, along with other powerful new 
technologies, can potentially support human liberation and sustainable 
development. The realities of power politics and commercial logic will 
mean, however, that this is no more than an elusive promise in most Third 
World settings.  
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